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Review*
How Markets Fail, by John Cassidy, is another in a run of books that feed off the 
corpse of neoliberalism. It is inspired by events pertaining to the current financial crisis. But 
this book is not just about finance, it also provides a rough overview of trends in the field 
of economics before concentrating on the theory of finance and on the current financial 
crisis. The book is divided into three parts – utopian economics or “bad” economics, 
reality-based or “good” economics and current crisis overview. One drawback of this book 
is this black and white division of economics, especially since a number of chapters are 
devoted to a specific economist. Thus, one might infer that this book also provides a list of 
“good” and “bad” economists. However, a thorough reading shows that the author praises 
the achievements of a number of “utopians”, including Friedrich August von Hayek. This 
book is not a tombstone to free markets; it just wants to show that we do not need free 
markets all the time and in every situation.
In the first part, the author discusses the historical development and rise of utopian 
economics, a type of economics that works well in theory but somehow fails to perform 
once put into practice. Cassidy equates utopian economics with self-regulating markets 
or the free market economy. It is not that this is the only type of utopian economics, but 
this particular type is the main subject of analysis. 
The origins of the free market economy are in the work of Adam Smith. Smith believed 
that the invisible hand of the market can transform individuals’ selfish acts into socially 
desirable outcomes. All the state needed to do was to let the markets work its magic, and 
a few other things. It is well known that Smith did not believe that national defense, the 
enforcement of laws and public works should be left to the market. But what is less well 
known is that Smith also did not really trust financial markets and believed the state should 
actively try to minimize periods of financial hysteria and depression. Therefore, it seems 
the idea of self-regulating financial markets is of a newer date and cannot be traced back 
to good old Smith. 
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One of the economists who took Adam Smith’s idea of an invisible hand too far is 
Friedrich August von Hayek. Hayek was considered more of a political theorist of liber-
tarianism than a fully fledged economist. His major contribution to economic theory is 
that people use market prices to convey information. Now, the information is fragmen-
ted (I may know something while others know something else) and the state might have 
the most information but it cannot have all the information. Therefore, Hayek concluded, 
the state cannot set prices. Setting wrong prices sends people wrong messages that dis-
tort their behavior. But, how do we know that the prices in a free market system send the 
“right” signals?
Hayek was more of a philosopher than a mathematician and providing the mathematical 
evidence that market gets prices right was started by Leon Walras and Vilfredo Pareto 
in the late 19th century. But the final touch was provided by Kenneth Arrow and Gerard 
Debreu much later. Arrow put forward two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. 
First, all competitive equilibriums are Pareto-efficient. Simply put, this was mathematical 
proof of the invisible hand. The second theorem deals with equity since some equilibriums 
involve higher inequalities than others. Arrow managed to prove that government, as 
long as it performs redistribution in an appropriate manner, can select the most socially 
desirable Pareto-efficient state and the market will generate the prices needed to support 
such a state. Interestingly, even though Arrow’s theoretical work was a gospel of free 
market economics, when he offered policy advice it was mostly interventionist. After 
constructing his general equilibrium theory, in which prices reflect economic fundamentals 
in all markets, Arrow moved to explain why economies are not in a state of general 
equilibrium. The problem of general equilibrium theory is that it has some constraining 
and unrealistic assumption, like no economies of scale. An even bigger problem is when 
the economy is struck by an exogenous shock, e.g. September 11th or the creation of OPEC 
and a sudden rise in oil prices. A number of authors proved that in such a scenario, actors 
following conditions specified in general equilibrium theory can react in a bizarre way. 
Interestingly, one of these authors was Gerard Debreu himself. 
The main populizer of the idea of free markets was Milton Freedman, who used a 
cunning way to connect his case with American tradition of individualism. Freedman 
claimed that economic freedoms were necessary to maintain political freedoms, thus 
connecting deregulation and privatization with fighting communism. Simply put, to further 
his cause, Freedman used language that the American people could understand and would 
accept.
The self-regulating market theory in finance is called efficient market theory, which 
claims that prices in the financial markets are tied to economic fundamentals (e.g., cor-
porate profits). In other words, financial markets get prices right. This argument stems 
from the simple observation that movement of stock prices is difficult to predict. But, the 
jump from a well grounded claim that the prediction of future prices is difficult to clai-
ming these prices must be right extremely dubious. In fact, there is some predictability 
in the movement of stock prices. More importantly, Gene Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz 
showed a logical inconsistency in efficient markets theory. Efficient market theory cla-
ims that every new piece of information will automatically translate itself into prices. Yet, 
if this were to be true, Grossman and Stiglitz argued, there would be no incentive for in-
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vestors to look for new data since this data would be incorporated into prices before they 
could make a profit off it. 
By 1980, the idea of self-regulating markets had become the majority opinion. In 1980 
Robert Lucas, who would later win a Nobel Prize, for instance, claimed that no under-40 
economist worthy of any respect could still be a Keynesian. In the 1970s, however, even 
right wing presidents such as Richard Nixon declared themselves Keynesians. 
Part two is devoted to reality-based economics. This is not a unified school. Instead, 
its focus is on correcting numerous failings in the free-market economic theory. One of 
the major problems of self-regulating markets is spillovers. Implicit in spillovers is that 
there is discrepancy between social and private costs and benefits. For instance, using fo-
ssil fuels creates private costs, i.e. the price of fossil fuels, and social costs, global war-
ming. The problem is that market actors are driven by private costs and benefits and ne-
glect social cost-benefits because market prices do not incorporate them. Therefore, mar-
ket prices can send some very wrong signals – it is, after all, rational industrialists that 
drive the global warming phenomenon. 
Ronald Coase tried to resolve the problem of spillovers within self-regulating 
market theory. He pointed out that negative spillovers will be resolved if there are clear 
property rights in place and if the law is enforced. The idea is that a polluting company 
and individuals suffering from pollution will negotiate the best solution if the law clearly 
recognizes the one’s right to produce and the other’s right to breathe fresh air and live 
healthily. But Coase himself pointed out that his model will work only when negotiating 
costs are negligible. Unfortunately, in cases with large number of parties the negotiating 
process will be very costly, if it is even able to reach any conclusion.
The next problem with the free market economy is that it often leads to monopolies 
and oligopolies. For instance, W. B. Arthur argued that monopolies are endemic in the 
high-tech sector. His reasoning was that chance events and network effects can help an 
inferior to drive out a superior product. The logic behind his claim is that attractiveness 
of one product is not just its quality but how many people are using it. For instance, I 
will continue using Facebook or iPod even if there is a superior product on the market, 
provided that my friends use Facebook and iPod. 
Furthermore, markets might behave weirdly in the presence of hidden information. As 
George Akerloff suggested in his analysis of the second hand car market, bad products can 
squeeze out good products. For instance, potential buyers might be very skeptical about 
the quality of the second hand cars. For one, if second hand cars worked well, why would 
their owners try to sell them? In effect, potential buyers might be very reluctant to pay a 
lot of money for used cars. In return, potential sellers of used cars might be reluctant to sell 
good cars, because they will not be able to get a good price. As a result, the second hand 
car market might be overflooded with “lemons” or bad second hand cars. In a nutshell, 
both hidden information and spillovers drive markets to send the wrong signals. 
Markets can also send the wrong signals in the financial markets. For instance, market 
players prefer conformity. One research work showed that investors who used unorthodox 
strategies were more likely to get fired or miss a promotion. In effect, peer pressure makes 
investors adopt the strategies of the majority of investors, even if they are not too convinced 
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about its merits, because it is better to fail “conventionally” than “unconventionally”. 
Furthermore, markets can lead investors to forget about fundamentals. In presence of 
noise traders, who concentrate on irrelevant information, it makes sense for sophisticated 
traders, who base their decisions on the fundamentals, to keep the prices rising because 
noise traders will just keep buying these shares, thus creating a bubble.
Research in psychology has put a serious question mark on investors’ ability to con-
centrate on the long-term fundamentals. For instance, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tver-
sky showed that when outcomes are uncertain, people do not rationalize but instead use 
the rule of thumb. These mental shortcuts include a tendency to generalize on the basis of 
insufficient evidence (e.g., using small and unrepresentative samples), putting too much 
weight in one’s own experience and a general inclination to judge things relative to arbi-
trary reference points. For instance, in the current debate on the success or failure of Pre-
sident Obama’s economic recovery plan, pro-market economists argue that it failed be-
cause state intervention is always bound to fail, while the Keynesians argue that it failed 
because state intervention in the economy was not strong enough.
Still, probably the most devastating critic of efficient market theory was put forward 
by Hyman Minsky. Minsky argued that peoples’ risk preferences depend on the overall 
state of the economy. Therefore, during good times, investors tend to be overly brave, 
taking more and more leverage and making even riskier investments. The end result is 
a bubble. But, when the bubble bursts, investors become overly cautious, avoiding even 
good investment options and thus leading the economy into depression. In a nutshell, free 
market economy’s natural path is from euphoria to depression and then back to euphoria. 
Capitalism is, thus, inherently unstable, argues Minsky, and the government’s job is to 
control the cycles of euphoria and depression.
Part three, consisting of seven chapters, is entirely devoted to explaining the causes 
and events leading to the current financial crisis. Charles Kindelberger argued that 
every bubble has five stages. It starts with some sort of displacement, in this case drastic 
reduction in interest rates, which creates a boom. Boom evolves into euphoria and after 
reaching a peak, the bubble goes bust. But, what made the current financial and property 
bubble different from previous ones was its geographic spread. While previous bubbles 
were geographically concentrated, this one was very widely disseminated. On the other 
hand, what it had in common with previous bubbles was policy-makers being blinded by 
an illusion of stability; financial innovations, which made speculation easier; and New 
Era thinking, characterized by overconfidence and disaster myopia. 
Fed chairman Alan Greenspan kept interest rates too low for too long because of his 
belief in the new financial products’ ability to diversify and minimize risk. But these new 
financial products also distorted incentives for the banks. For instance, securitization of 
bank debt allowed banks to transfer the risk of bad loans to investors who bought these 
securities. By doing this, the system created incentives for the banks to give out bad loans. 
Instead of rewarding prudence, markets began rewarding excessive risk. 
Still, if the Fed did a lousy job in the events leading to the crisis, it did an even 
worse job after the crisis erupted. The main blunder that both Ben Bernanke, the new Fed 
chairman, and Henry Paulson, Treasury Secretary, shared was their belief that markets 
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would somehow correct themselves. Thus, after bailing out Bear Stearns, they let Lehman 
Brothers crumble in an attempt to send a message to the market that imprudent behavior 
will not be tolerated. Yet, this decision proved to be catastrophic because it caused panic 
on the financial markets. Luckily, their commitment to free markets lasted for less than 
48 hours, when they bailed out AIG, America’s largest insurer.
In conclusion, John Cassidy argues that current financial crisis was created by utopian 
economics and its belief that markets are always right. Quite on the contrary, we need to 
change our understanding of economics and accept that markets are a useful tool but with 
some important shortcomings, and this is precisely the job of reality-based economics. 
Unfortunately, it seems that little improvement has been made. The recent struggle to 
introduce universal and mandatory health care system in the United States showed that 
people still believe that there is only a choice between liberty (self-regulating markets) 
and socialism (state intervention). Furthermore, President Obama’s plan does not go far 
enough in changing the system; it seems more a re-modification of the present system. 
And John Cassidy firmly believes that the main cause of this crisis was not “bad” bankers 
but a “bad” system, which distorted incentives and rewarded excessive risk taking over 
prudence. 
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